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THE IMPLAUSIBILITY STANDARD FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PLAINTIFFS: THE TWIQBAL 
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING STANDARD AND 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Celeste Anquonette Ajayi* 
Abstract: Environmental plaintiffs often face challenges when pleading their claims. This 
is due to difficulty in obtaining the particular facts needed to establish causation, and thus 
liability. In turn, this difficulty inhibits their ability to vindicate their rights. Prior to the shift 
in pleading standards created by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, often 
informally referred to as “Twiqbal,” plaintiffs could assert their claims through the simplified 
notice pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson. This allowed plaintiffs to gain access 
to discovery, which aided in proving their claims. 
The current heightened pleading standard established by Twiqbal, also referred to as the 
plausibility pleading standard, serves as a gatekeeping mechanism that keeps environmental 
plaintiffs out of courts and away from justice by dismissing meritorious claims. Meanwhile, 
courts have repeatedly refused to apply the heightened pleading standard to defendants’ 
pleadings, namely affirmative defenses, resulting in a split across the circuit courts. This 
practice aids defendants at the expense of plaintiffs by allowing defendants to adhere to a less 
stringent standard, putting plaintiffs on unequal footing. The standard allows defendants to 
make conclusory assertions, which may effectively defeat a plaintiff’s case. Further, this 
practice increases the possibility of judicial bias because various courts across the United States 
apply different standards to both parties. If courts instead uniformly applied the heightened 
pleading standard to both plaintiffs and defendants alike and allowed environmental plaintiffs 
relaxed specificity requirements due to their limited access to information at the pleading stage, 
it could address some of the inequalities created as a result of Twiqbal. 
This Comment examines the impact of the heightened pleading standard on environmental 
plaintiffs and proposes the circuit split be reconciled. Part I discusses the massive shift to the 
heightened pleading standard from Conley to Twombly and Iqbal. Part II explains three main 
critiques of the Twiqbal plausibility pleading standard. Part III discusses the unique attributes 
of environmental litigation that are in conflict with the heightened pleading standard. Part IV 
explains the conflict between the heightened pleading standard and environmental litigation 
through a case study of the different ways in which courts have inconsistently applied the 
heightened pleading standard to plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ affirmative defenses. 
Finally, Part V argues that courts should apply the Twiqbal standard in a consistent manner to 
both plaintiffs and defendants, as well as provide flexibility to environmental plaintiffs’ 
pleadings to ensure plaintiffs have adequate access to the requisite information needed to 
sufficiently plead their cases and receive justice. 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. I want to thank Professor 
Jeff Feldman for his guidance and perspective in the development of this Comment. I also want to 
thank my colleagues in Washington Law Review Notes & Comments Department for their dedication 
to and input into this Comment, particularly Kayla Ganir, Caroline Sung, and Zander Hoke. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) allowed plaintiffs to assert their 
claims through simplified notice pleading and prove their claims through 
facts obtained during the discovery process.3 Now, the plausibility 
pleading standard established in Twombly and Iqbal undermines this 
process and places additional burdens on plaintiffs seeking to bring 
environmental claims.4 If a toxic tort or contamination claim is an 
aggrieved party’s only cause of action, justified plaintiffs may not be able 
to vindicate their rights in the court system at all.5 
Environmental law is a unique area of law that often requires a basic 
understanding of the underlying science to recognize when there is an 
environmental harm.6 Since the shift to the plausibility pleading standard, 
environmental practitioners find asserting claims burdensome due to 
difficulty in obtaining the necessary facts to establish that the defendant 
caused their harm.7 These necessary facts tend to be extremely 
particularized but often unobtainable without discovery.8 As a result, 
 
1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
3. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 47 (1957). 
4. Kevin T. Haroff, Open or Shut—Pleading Federal Environmental Claims After Twombly and 
Iqbal, 13 NO. 2 ABA ENV’L. LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMM. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, New York, 
N.Y.), July 2012, at 3. 
5. Note, Causation in Environmental Law: Lessons from Toxic Torts, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2256, 
2261–62 (2015). 
6. See Jeff Surtees, What Is Environmental Law and Why Is it Hard to Understand?, LAWNOW 
(Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.lawnow.org/environmental-law-hard-understand [https://perma.cc/S9R9-
FNL3]; Eric Biber, Environmental Law in Canada, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 30, 2012), https://legal-
planet.org/2012/04/30/environmental-law-in-canada/ [https://perma.cc/2BTH-N5ZS]. Both the 
United States and Canada have similar environmental laws, including the United States’ National 
Environmental Policy Act and Canada’s federal environmental review statute, thus a need for a basic 
understanding of the science underlying harm is relevant in both countries. Further, Canada’s 
environmental laws are much less strict than the United States’ laws. 
7. See Scott Foster, Breaking the Transsubstantive Pleading Mold: Public Interest Environmental 
Litigation After Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 885, 903–04 (2011); 
Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2261. 
8. Foster, supra note 7, at 902. Foster discusses two cases—Goliad Cnty. v. Uranium Energy Corp., 
No. V-08-18, 2009 WL 1586688 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2009), and Env’t World Watch, Inc. v. Walt 
Disney Co., No. CV 09-04045 DDP, 2009 WL 3365915 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2009)—where the 
importance of discovery was shown in environmental litigation. Id. In Goliad County, the court found 
that the plaintiff lacked sufficient factual allegations under Iqbal because they could not show 
intention of the defendant to contaminate water. Id. In Environmental World Watch, the court found 
that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations were sufficient even though they were unable to show the 
toxicity level of Disney’s Cr(VI) discharge. Id. Cr(VI) is “one of the valence states . . . of the element 
chromium,” which is often used in industrial processes and “known to cause cancer.” Hexavalent 
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pleading has become a gatekeeping mechanism that keeps environmental 
plaintiffs out of courts and away from justice.9 This is particularly evident 
in toxic tort and environmental contamination cases due to the slow-
revealing nature of environmental harm.10 Meanwhile, defendants may 
simply assert a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to efficiently end a claim 
against them or assert affirmative defenses in a conclusory manner. 
Various criticisms of the Twombly and Iqbal rulings have come to light 
as a result of the cases’ establishment of the plausibility pleading standard. 
Three main criticisms are that the standard results in plaintiffs’ inability 
to receive and access justice;11 unfair burdens on plaintiffs;12 and judicial 
bias leading to nonuniformity.13 These injustices must be addressed to 
ameliorate the harm that Twiqbal has caused. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the shift in pleading standards from 
notice pleading set out in Conley v. Gibson14 to heightened pleading 
established by both Twombly and Iqbal and the circuit split that has 
occurred as a result. Part II explains three main critiques the Twiqbal 
plausibility pleading standard has generated. Part III discusses the unique 
 
Chromium, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/hexavalent-chromium 
[https://perma.cc/9DVA-QJJU]. Both cases involved a missing fact, but the courts reached two 
different conclusions. Foster, supra note 7, at 902. Goliad County “represents an entire class of cases 
where potentially meritorious claims cannot move into discovery on the basis of pleading a fact that 
has not, but might, come to light.” Id. This shows not only the need for discovery, but also how the 
heightened pleading standard has disparate impacts. Id. 
9. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 821, 823 (2010). 
10. See Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2261–62; Foster, supra note 7, at 903–
04. 
11. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a 
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 399, 405 (2011) (stating that Twiqbal 
“undercut[] the effectiveness of congressional statutes” that were intended to “compensate citizens 
for injury” and gave trial judges “enormous discretionary power to dismiss complaints,” even if the 
cases would have been meritorious). 
12. See, e.g., Leslie A. Gordon, For Federal Plaintiffs, Twombly and Iqbal Still Present a Catch-
22, ABA J.: THE NAT’L PULSE (Jan. 1, 2011, 8:50 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/for_federal_plaintiffs_twombly_and_iqbal_still_prese
nt_a_catch-22 [https://perma.cc/G4U3-A4M7] (stating that Twiqbal created an unfair burden on 
plaintiffs without the tool of pre-trial discovery because if detailed facts are needed from the 
beginning, plaintiffs “may have to foot the bill to investigate on their own,” which creates a burden 
at best, “just to have [their] case heard on the merits” or at worst, that is a “complete barrier to the 
courthouse”). 
13. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal 
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 65, 82 (2010) (stating that Twiqbal put an “emphasis on the conclusory nature of an allegation,” 
which now requires judges to make a distinction between conclusory and non-conclusory allegations. 
This emphasis creates a uniformity issue among courts because there has not been a “principled and 
uniform way” in which judges can make this distinction.). 
14. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
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attributes of environmental litigation that are in conflict with the 
heightened pleading standard. Part IV explains the conflict between the 
heightened pleading standard and environmental litigation through a case 
study of the different ways in which courts have inconsistently applied the 
heightened pleading standard to plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ 
affirmative defenses. Finally, Part V argues that courts should apply the 
Twiqbal standard in a consistent manner to both plaintiffs and defendants 
and provide flexibility to environmental plaintiffs’ pleadings to not only 
resolve the circuit split, but ensure plaintiffs have adequate access to the 
requisite information needed to sufficiently plead their cases. 
I. THE MASSIVE SHIFT IN PLEADING STANDARDS 
Pleading is a necessary step to initiate a civil suit that has evolved over 
time from the notice pleading established in Conley v. Gibson to the more 
stringent plausibility pleading standard created by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Generally, the person bringing suit, the 
plaintiff, must file a complaint that lays out their version of facts and the 
cause of action, “highlighting the factual and legal basis of the suit.”15 The 
defendant then files an answer. This includes an explanation as to why the 
plaintiff should not prevail and may also include additional facts or an 
excuse for the defendant’s actions.16 The defendant may also file a 
counterclaim, arising from the same facts, asserting that the plaintiff has 
caused them harm.17 Either the defendant or the plaintiff may have to file 
a reply answering new allegations in the pleadings.18 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) govern the general rules 
of pleading for all parties to civil litigation. Under FRCP 8(a), a plaintiff’s 
claim for relief must contain: 
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim 
needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include 
relief in the alternative or different types of relief.19 
Under FRCP 8(b)(1), a defendant responding to a pleading must: 
 
15. How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial: Pleadings, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/h




19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 
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“(A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted 
against it; and (B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an 
opposing party.”20 Under FRCP 8(c), when responding to a pleading, a 
party must “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”21 
There are two distinct types of defenses in civil litigation: factual 
defenses to a plaintiff’s claim and affirmative defenses. A factual defense 
is an “attack on a plaintiff’s prima facie case” and directly contradicts 
elements of the claim.22 These defenses “negate an element of the 
plaintiff’s claim” or state that the plaintiff cannot meet its burden of 
proof.23 By contrast, affirmative defenses assert that, even if the factual 
allegations asserted in the complaint are true,24 the defendant should avoid 
liability “based on additional allegations of excuse, justification or other 
negating matters.”25 
When reviewing the plaintiff’s complaint, the court will ignore 
conclusions of law and assume well-pleaded facts to be true.26 These well-
pleaded facts are not mere “recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” 
but are based upon factual information.27 Then, the court will determine 
whether the claim is plausible. The claim is plausible when the factual 
content of the plaintiff’s complaint “allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.”28 To meet the plausibility standard, the plaintiff must show it is 
more likely than not that the defendant is liable based on well-pleaded 
facts.29 Although drawing inferences may be necessary, the defendant’s 
 
20. Id. at 8(b)(1). 
21. Id. at 8(c)(1). These affirmative defenses include, but are not limited to, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, laches, res 
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver. Id. 
22. Julianne M. Hartzell, United States: ‘The Forgotten Pleading’ Serves as Guide to Determining 




24. Affirmative Defense, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/affirmative_defense (last visited Aug. 18, 2021). 
25. Hartzell, supra note 22; see also How Courts Work, supra note 15 (explaining that in a 
defendant’s answer to the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendant may “offer additional facts” or “plead 
an excuse”); Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 743, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
26. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
27. C. Kevin Marshall, Pleading Facts and Arguing Plausibility: Federal Pleading Standards a 
Year After Iqbal, JONES DAY (June 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2010/06/pleading-
facts-and-arguing-plausibility-federal-pleading-standards-a-year-after-iiqbali 
[https://perma.cc/QK46-5MD4] (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). 
28. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. 
29. Id. 
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liability for misconduct must be more than a possibility, meaning the 
plaintiff must nudge the claim across the line from possible to plausible.30 
Plausibility has not been adequately defined by the courts, but Twiqbal 
established that allegations are not entitled to be deemed true solely 
because they are bare assertions, conclusory, or a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of a claim.31 This plausibility pleading standard established 
in Twiqbal shifted massively from the notice pleading standard set out in 
Conley. 
A. The Conley v. Gibson Notice Pleading Standard 
Pleading requirements shifted completely from the Conley v. Gibson 
notice pleading standard, which stood for fifty years, as a result of the Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal cases. The term “notice 
pleading” was first introduced in Conley by the United States Supreme 
Court.32 
In Conley, African American railway employees alleged in their 
complaint that an exclusive bargaining agreement between the Railway 
and the Union under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) gave employees in the 
bargaining unit certain protections from discharge and loss of seniority.33 
The railroad claimed the union completely abolished forty-five jobs that 
were held by African American employees.34 However, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the Railroad actually filled these forty-five positions with 
white employees as the African Americans were “ousted.”35 Conley held 
that the FRCP do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon 
which they base their claim and that a complaint should be dismissed only 
when it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts” 
that support their allegations.36 Under Conley, the plaintiffs only needed 
to notify the defendants of the issues raised. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
held that the African American railway employees’ complaint was 
sufficient in alleging a breach of the union’s statutory duty under the RLA 
to represent all employees within the union fairly and without hostile 
discrimination.37 If these allegations were proven, then there was a 
 
30. Id. 
31. Brandon L. Garrett, Applause for the Plausible, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 221, 221 (2014). 
32. Robin J. Effron, Putting the “Notice” Back into Pleading, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 981, 996 
(2020). 
33. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 43 (1957). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 45. 
37. Id. at 48. 
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“manifest breach of the Union’s statutory duty,” giving the petitioners a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.38 Thus, there was sufficient 
evidence of a manifest breach because the complaint stated that they were 
wrongfully discharged and that the Union refused to protect them.39 With 
liberal opportunity for discovery and other pretrial procedures established 
by the FRCP, this simplified “notice pleading” was long believed to be 
sufficient.40 This standard stood for decades until Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly was decided. 
B. The Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal Shift to 
the Plausibility Pleading Standard 
The notice pleading standard stood for decades until Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly was decided. In 2007, Twombly, a subscriber of local 
telephone services, alleged that Bell Atlantic and other local telephone 
companies conspired to restrain trade by inflating charges for local 
telephone and high-speed Internet services.41 He further alleged that the 
companies engaged in parallel conduct in their service areas to inhibit 
growth of new companies.42 The Supreme Court held the complaint did 
not include facts to suggest that refraining from competition was in 
conflict with the companies’ economic interests or that the actions taken 
were because of a conspiracy.43 This holding was due to the complaint’s 
conclusory statements and lack of particular facts.44 After the Twombly 
ruling, plaintiffs now needed to plead in their complaint “something 
more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] 
a legally cognizable right of action.”45 This was a huge shift from the 
simple notice pleading suggested in Conley to a much more stringent and 
demanding standard that gives judges enhanced discretion.46 The 
Twombly Court stated that courts must assess the pleadings’ sufficiency 
and determine if the claim crosses the line from “conceivable to 
plausible.”47 The Court’s basis for inserting this plausibility requirement 
 
38. Id. at 46. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 47. 
41. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 564–70. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 555 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). 
46. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 22 (2010). 
47. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
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stemmed from the word “showing” in FRCP 8(a).48 The Court believed a 
plaintiff must lay out detailed facts of a defendant’s behavior that directly 
shows a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, rather than merely any set of facts 
that leave “open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some 
‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.”49 This standard was 
further defined by Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 
In 2009, Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani pretrial detainee, filed suit 
against past and present government officials claiming that their actions 
against him were unconstitutional with regard to the harsh conditions of 
his confinement.50 Iqbal’s complaint stated that former Attorney General 
John Ashcroft and Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Robert Mueller designated him a “person of high interest” based on his 
race, religion, or national origin in violation of the First and Fifth 
Amendments.51 Iqbal asserted that Mueller directed the FBI to detain Arab 
Muslim men during its September 11 investigation and that Ashcroft was 
the “principal architect” of the agency’s discriminatory policy.52 Iqbal 
argued that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and 
maliciously agreed to subject” him to harsh conditions in confinement as 
a policy matter.53 Here, the Supreme Court held that Iqbal’s complaint 
was insufficient, because Iqbal’s various claims were conclusory, were 
not entitled to be assumed true, and Ashcroft and Mueller’s approval of 
the detention policy did not “plausibly” suggest that they purposefully 
discriminated based on race, religion, or national origin.54 
The Court in Iqbal extended the plausibility standard to all civil actions 
and took the pleading requirements of Twombly further,55 stating that 
“recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”56 To meet the plausibility 
standard, the plaintiff’s claim must contain factual content that “allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged,” rather than a mere possibility.57 Iqbal 
implemented a two-step process: (1) “identify the unadorned matter and 
discard it”; and (2) “take the remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, 
 
48. Id. at 555. 
49. Id. at 561. 
50. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009). 
51. Id. at 669. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 680. 
54. Id. at 683. 
55. Id. at 684. 
56. Id. at 678. 
57. Id. at 663. 
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accept them as true, ‘and then determine whether they plausibly give rise 
to an entitlement to relief.’”58 A court does not need to take facts as true 
if they are deemed conclusory. If facts are deemed conclusory, a court 
must ignore them. 
C. Twiqbal Split Across the Circuits 
Despite the Supreme Court’s Twiqbal rulings, federal district courts are 
divided on whether the heightened pleading standard applies to 
affirmative defenses.59 This division means the standard is applied 
differently depending on the court in which the case is filed. Therefore, 
plaintiffs with similar harms receive “different treatment across 
jurisdictions.”60 Further, the United States Circuit Courts continually 
avoid the question of whether the Twiqbal standard applies to affirmative 
defenses.61 As a result of this avoidance, the standard is applied differently 
across the circuits. In Jones v. Bryant Park Market Events, L.L.C.,62 the 
Second Circuit stated that it did not need to address the plausibility 
question because “even if [it] were to apply the Iqbal-Twombly standard 
to affirmative defenses,” it would not help the plaintiff.63 Likewise, in 
Depositors Insurance Co. v. Estate of Ryan,64 the Sixth Circuit stated that 
it was unnecessary for it to resolve the plausibility issue because the 
district court did not apply the standard to the appellants’ affirmative 
defenses.65 Additionally, in Herrera v. Churchill McGee, L.L.C.,66 the 
Sixth Circuit further stated that it had “no occasion to address, and 
express[ed] no view” regarding Twombly and Iqbal on affirmative 
defenses.67 As a result, circuit and district courts have been inconsistent 
in applying the Twombly and Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses.68 
 
58. Matthew Schafer, Ten Years Later: Pleading Standards and Actual Malice, COMMC’NS. LAW., 
Winter 2020, at 1, 34 (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679). 
59. See infra Part IV. 
60. Deborah Beim, Intercircuit Splits, UNIV. OF MICH. COLL. OF LITERATURE, SCI., & THE ARTS, 
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/dbeim/research/intercircuit-splits/ [https://perma.cc/XKR5-HYLJ]. 
61. See infra notes 62–68. 
62. 658 F. App’x 621 (2d Cir. 2016). 
63. Id. at 624. 
64. 637 F. App’x 864 (6th Cir. 2016). 
65. Id. at 869. 
66. 680 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2012). 
67. Id. at 547 n.6. 
68. See Jonathan M. Herman, Jaime Stilson & Kaleb McNeely, Plausibility in the Eye of the 
Beholder: Circuits Address How to Read Twombly, 32 ANTITRUST 32, 35 (2017). 
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II. ISSUES WITH THE TWIQBAL HEIGHTENED PLEADING 
STANDARD 
Since the Twombly and Iqbal rulings, various criticisms have come to 
light as a result of the cases’ establishment of the plausibility pleading 
standard. Three main criticisms of the pleading standard among scholars 
include plaintiffs’ inability to receive and access justice, unfair burdens 
on plaintiffs, and judicial bias leading to nonuniformity.69 Iqbal is 
criticized for rewriting FRCP 8 to immunize executive officials at the 
expense of plaintiffs.70 Further, the ruling portrays Twiqbal’s impact on 
access to justice and fairness as a result of the highest court’s 
susceptibility to bias.71 
A. Plaintiffs’ Inability to Receive and Access Justice 
The Twiqbal shift created concern about the inability of plaintiffs to 
access justice for their meritorious claims.72 Iqbal created a roadblock to 
the courts for many types of plaintiffs by sustaining the belief that the 
government may legally rely on “race, religion, or national origin in the 
wartime context.”73 The commitment to allow plaintiffs full and equal 
 
69. See supra notes 11–13. 
70. Cara Shepley, Note, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: How the Supreme Court Rewrote Rule 8 to Immunize 
High-Level Executive Officials from Post-9/11 Liability (A Plausible Interpretation), 69 MD. L. REV. 
ENDNOTES 69, 101 (2010). 
71. Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEORGETOWN L.J. 379, 439 (2017). Sinnar criticizes 
the court’s presentation of Javaid Iqbal without adequate consideration of the roles of race and religion 
in detentions after September 11, calling the court “[o]blivious” to Iqbal as a person, “blind” to race 
and religion with regard to post-September 11 detentions, and “indifferent” to the harm of the 
practices it legitimized. Id. While the court majority believed that the detention decisions were based 
on neither racial or religious criteria, or that use of such criteria was “rational and justified,” the 
process of detainee identification and classification may have heavily relied on these factors 
regardless of the lack of connections these individuals had to terrorism. Id. at 419–25. See also 
Shepley, supra note 70, at 96–100 (discussing that while Justice Kennedy believed that Ashcroft’s 
actions regarding the September 11 detention policy showed legitimate and necessary security 
measures after a homeland attack, Justice Souter came to a nearly opposite conclusion). Shepley 
argues that the contrast between Kennedy and Souter’s opinions show the inherent subjectivity given 
to the judicial branch and criticizes the subjectivity displayed in Iqbal as shifting away from Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), which held that judicial review is saying what the law is 
rather than what it should be. Id. at 114. The Supreme Court seems to have effectively decided what 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is rather than adhering to congressional intent of the FRCP. Id. at 
117. 
72. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 11; Gordon, supra note 12; Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: 
The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1568 
(2016). 
73. Dawinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the 
Wartime Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 505 (2010). 
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access to the courts has been repudiated.74 
Scholars and members of Congress worry that the heightened pleading 
standard has and will continue to diminish plaintiffs’ ability to effectively 
bring suit against their wrongdoers.75 While defendants have the ability to 
bring FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss “without ever filing a pleading,” 
plaintiffs “will be left out in the cold” because of the heightened burden 
on pleadings.76 This is especially true in toxic tort and discrimination 
cases, where discovery is essential to establish the facts.77 Without 
discovery, obtaining the facts needed to comply with the heightened 
pleading standard is extremely difficult.78 
In environmental cases, the plaintiff now must plead a “factually 
plausible case” without access to the “tools of discovery to uncover the 
kind of evidence that would make their claim plausible.”79 Defendants 
“inherently possess[] all the factual information,” especially in cases 
regarding toxic chemicals and pesticides, because they have the ability to 
conceal this evidence.80 In these cases, it is difficult to determine the cost 
of remedial measures resulting from pollutants and trace the specific harm 
with the specific chemical, source, and party responsible.81 This is because 
harms may not appear until years after the exposure and the harmed 
person “may have been exposed to a variety of potentially harmful 
substances” caused by multiple actors.82 Consequently, tracing the harm 
to the specific responsible actor to establish causation, which is required 
to prove that the defendant actually caused the harm, may not be possible 
 
Although the Supreme Court sustained this belief, the resulting procedural roadblocks for various 
types of plaintiffs do not all directly relate to an individual’s race, religion, or national origin. See also 
Malveaux, supra note 13, at 82; Gordon, supra note 12; Gilles, supra note 72, at 1568. 
74. See Heather Buchanan, The Promise and Reality of Equal Access to Justice, INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. L. SYS. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://iaals.du.edu/blog/promise-and-reality-
equal-access-justice [https://perma.cc/X928-L2GT]; Arthur R. Miller, Widening the Lens: Refocusing 
the Litigation Cost-and-Delay Narrative, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 57, 72 (2018). 
75. See Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on the Const., 
C.R., & C.L., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. Jerrod Nadler, Chairman, Subcomm. on the 
Const., C.R., and C.L.) [hereinafter Access to Justice Denied]; Malveaux, supra note 13. 
76. Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental 
Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 580 (2012). 
77. Id. 
78. Zachry Sandifer, Insurmountable Burdens and Slippery Slopes: A Solution for Pleading Toxic 
Torts in the Plausibility Era, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 435, 437 (2019). 
79. WILLIAM FUNK, THOMAS OWEN MCGARITY, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JAMES GOODWIN, 
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING: BARRING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR TO DESERVING CLAIMANTS 10 (2010). 
80. Id. 
81. See David T. Buente Jr., Thomas G. Echikson & James L. Connaughton, The “Civil” 
Implications of Environmental Crimes, 23 ENV’T L. REP. 10589, 10597 (1993); Causation in 
Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2259. 
82. Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2259. 
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in an environmental suit.83 One scholar has gone as far as calling the 
Twiqbal standard “indefensible” if one “cares about enabling private 
litigants” in their right to assert substantive law violations through the 
court system.84 This scholar argues that the pleading requirements were 
redefined in Iqbal to protect government defendants, as well as corporate 
ones, at the expense of plaintiffs.85 
Other scholars argue that the Twiqbal standard simply helps secure the 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of each action and proceeding 
provided for in FRCP 1.86 They argue that the requirements inserted by 
Twiqbal ensure plaintiffs are justified when “invoking the coercive power 
of the state.”87 However, others describe the rulings as diminishing 
democracy for plaintiffs.88 These scholars argue that the Court effectively 
replaced the “system of notice pleading”89 and turned the dismissal 
motion, which was initially intended to only handle “rare complaints that 
lacked a valid legal theory,” into an efficient attack on complaints that are 
seen as “counterintuitive” by judges without the benefit of discovery.90 
Motions to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) are given “life-or-death 
significance,”91 as successful motions are “more than twice as likely” 
under the plausibility pleading standard.92 
B. Unfair Burdens on Plaintiffs 
Some scholars argue that the Twiqbal shift results in unfair burdens on 
plaintiffs and, as a result, skews the scale of justice in favor of defendants. 
One scholar asserts that if plaintiffs are expected to present “detailed facts 
from the outset,” rather than acquiring these facts through the discovery 
process, they may have to “foot the bill” to find the facts on their own.93 
This scholar states that at best, this creates an unfair burden, and at worst, 
 
83. Id. 
84. A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 
60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1735 (2013). 
85. Id. at 1737. 
86. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Presumption of Civil Innocence, 104 VA. L. REV. 589, 643 (2018); 
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 
87. Wilkinson III, supra 86, at 643. 
88. Burbank & Subrin, supra note 11, at 405–08. 
89. Id. at 403. 
90. Id. at 407. 
91. Miller, supra note 74, at 72. 
92. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 
AM. UNIV. L. REV. 553, 621 (2010). 
93. Gordon, supra note 12. 
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creates “a complete barrier to the courthouse.”94 
This barrier may also inhibit low-income litigants from obtaining 
adjudication. If the low-income population is no longer allowed access to 
court, neither are its “contributions, voices, and perspectives.”95 Another 
scholar calls this a “potentially high cost to both the affected groups and 
society more broadly.”96 As a result, low-income groups are essentially 
barred from accessing the civil justice system simply due to their income 
level. This is unfair and antithetical to the notion of justice.97 Even if 
plaintiffs are justified in bringing suit, they may face unreasonable 
litigation expenses, which will slow their case and result in excessive, and 
expensive, lawyer involvement.98 This relates to a low-income litigant’s 
ability to receive justice, as only the elite have adequate access to the court 
because Twiqbal effectively serves as a gatekeeping mechanism.99 For 
plaintiffs, the more stringent plausibility pleading standard creates 
“significantly higher and more resource-consumptive procedural 
barriers.”100 This resulting impact on civil suits runs contrary to many of 
the values underlying the FRCP, including fairness.101 Judicial decisions 
applying the plausibility standard to plaintiffs ultimately aid defendants at 
plaintiffs’ expense, which has been criticized as “contemptuous of history, 
rules, statutes, the Constitution, and principles of fairness.”102 These are 
rights that should be supported, but “cannot be without discovery.”103 
Other scholars argue that holding defendants to the same pleading 
standard as plaintiffs is unfair due to the “limited time and knowledge” 
 
94. Id. 
95. Gilles, supra note 72, at 1568. 
96. Id. 
97. See Sasha Nichols, Access to Cash, Access to Court: Unlocking the Courtroom Doors with 
Third-Party Litigation Finance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 197, 198 (2016) (arguing that plaintiffs with 
“potentially meritorious claims” cannot access the courthouse due to a “liquidity problem”: plaintiffs 
who “lack the capital necessary to pursue a claim” cannot pay for the various fees involved in 
litigation, including “court fees, lawyers’ fees, bond requirements, and expert witness fees,” leaving 
them with little resources to right the wrongs against them); Ian Weinstein, Coordinating Access to 
Justice for Low- and Moderate-Income People, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 504–05 (2017) 
(explaining that the justice system is intended for all, but there is a gap between the wealthy, who 
have “ready access to lawyers, courts, and alternative dispute resolution fora,” and low-income 
households, who have lower access to lawyers or courts yet more legal problems than even those of 
only “moderate means”). 
98. Miller, supra note 74, at 78–79. 
99. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 823; see Nichols, supra note 97, at 198. 
100. Miller, supra note 46, at 2. 
101. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. 
102. Subrin, supra note 76, at 581. 
103. Id. 
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possessed by the parties during the pleading stage.104 While it is true that, 
as a result of Twiqbal, more cases never reach discovery and dockets are 
less cluttered,105 this approach favors efficiency over fairness. Before 
Twiqbal, a plaintiff did not need to “set out in detail the facts upon which 
[they] base [their] claim,” but only needed to give the defendant fair notice 
of the claim.106 For example, an environmental plaintiff asserting a claim 
that the defendant intentionally failed to disclose the extent of soil and 
groundwater contamination before the plaintiff purchased the land likely 
would not need to lay out specific facts depicting the harm and the 
defendants’ state of mind in order to have sufficient pleadings. Under 
Twiqbal, the plaintiff’s pleadings now must contain sufficient 
particularity. This environmental plaintiff would likely need to plead more 
specific facts that directly link the defendant’s actions to the particular 
contaminant to avoid having their claim deemed conclusory by the court. 
However, this would be more difficult because they may not have access 
to the necessary facts without great expense. 
C. Judicial Bias Leading to Nonuniformity 
Judicial bias exists while determining plausibility because it is a 
subjective task. As a result, these decisions often lead to nonuniformity.107 
Determining plausibility and whether a complaint is conclusory is 
“[e]lusive and [p]roblematic.”108 It requires that judges use significant 
discretion in distinguishing between conclusory and non-conclusory 
allegations without a concrete framework that creates a conscientious and 
uniform analysis.109 
Iqbal is criticized as being a highly biased decision. According to one 
scholar, the Justices in Iqbal offered “their own version of activism in 
service of” their own general hostility to litigation and “challenges to 
government authority in particular.”110 One views the Court as treating 
“clearly factual allegations” as conclusory purely based on the fact that 
the Court does not believe them without further supporting information.111 
They attribute the Court’s skepticism in regard to certain factual 
 
104. Nathan Pysno, Should Twombly and Iqbal Apply to Affirmative Defenses?, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
1633, 1659 (2011). 
105. Id. at 1666. 
106. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 
107. See infra Part IV. 
108. Malveaux, supra note 13, at 82. 
109. Id. 
110. A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 185, 201 (2010). 
111. Id. 
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allegations to the Justices’ own “worldview and perspective as societal 
elites with various presumptions.”112 This suggests that evidence may be 
appraised in a biased manner by judges. Another scholar argues that we 
often can “construct our social world to avoid hearing certain types of 
claims.”113 This scholar argues that when dismissal is abused, it “breaches 
our duty to listen to our fellows and does not respect members of 
marginalized communities as epistemic agents.”114 Reasonable people can 
view the same objective facts differently based on their personal biases. 
Each Justice’s worldview allows them to “create conditions” where they 
feel justified in dismissing potentially meritorious claims.115 
People, even Supreme Court Justices, may fall victim to their own 
individual biases. The subjective and broad requirements of the Twiqbal 
pleading standard may result in judicial decisions based upon a biased 
review of factual assertions. While adjudicating claims requires a great 
deal of discretion, inserting a broad standard may lead to more biased 
opinions due to differences among judges’ personal perceptions paired 
with the lack of a concrete framework in applying the standard. In United 
States v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.,116 the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas held the plaintiffs’ 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA)117 arranger claim met the Twiqbal pleading standard.118 
The plaintiffs in that case asserted that the defendant sent radioactive 
materials for repair, storage, and disposal.119 Under CERCLA, one who 
arranges for the disposal or treatment of hazardous material is liable for 
its subsequent release into the environment.120 In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit in Hinds Investments, L.P. v. Angioli121 held that the plaintiffs 
asserting a CERCLA arranger claim did not meet the Twiqbal pleading 
standard.122 In Hinds, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants 
contributed to the disposal of hazardous waste by distributing manuals 
that instructed operators “to dispose of waste water down the drain and 
 
112. Id. 
113. David Schraub, Deliberation and Dismissal, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1319, 1386 (2020). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. No. H-07-3795, 2008 WL 656475 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2008). 
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75. 
118. Halliburton, 2008 WL 656475, at *1. 
119. Id. 
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). 
121. 445 F. App’x 917 (9th Cir. 2011). 
122. Id. at 919. 
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into the sewer.”123 The court stated that the plaintiffs had not “alleged facts 
showing [d]efendants sold dry cleaning equipment for the purpose of 
disposing of perchloroethylene or that [d]efendants exercised control over 
the disposal process”124 These two courts came to opposite conclusions 
when presented with similar assertions. While it is not possible to 
eliminate all bias in decision-making, becoming aware of personal bias 
and holding oneself accountable is feasible.125 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
Environmental law is unique and complex in that the field is heavily 
grounded in science and critical thinking. One generally needs a basic 
understanding of the science to recognize there is a problem.126 
Environmental law must be able to adapt to “developing ecological 
threats, evolving societal attitudes, and changing world circumstances,” 
but has failed to do so.127 This creates a higher burden for plaintiffs when 
attempting to plead an environmental claim. 
The current environmental laws are lengthy, detailed, and some set out 
a process rather than substantive standards. It is difficult to understand 
how to bring an environmental lawsuit, and to comprehend which statute 
is relevant. Environmental laws, such as the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA),128 generally inform an individual of the steps required 
to initiate a lawsuit, but do not pre-judge an outcome.129 This means that 
the statutes do not automatically determine the outcome. Contrastingly, 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)130 sets out firm 
definitions of the solid and hazardous waste it aims to regulate, as well as 
specific requirements for the categories of those who qualify for 
 
123. Id. at 920.  
124. Id. at 919. 
125. Lindsay Northon, Become Aware of Personal Bias, and You’ll Improve Ethical Practice, 
SHRM (July 12, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/behavioral-
competencies/ethical-practice/pages/become-aware-of-personal-bias-and-improve-ethical-practice-
.aspx [https://perma.cc/6HXB-A9NX]; Sharon Youmans & Elizabeth Ozer, Strategies to Address 
Unconscious Bias, UNIV. OF CAL., S.F. OFF. OF DIVERSITY & OUTREACH, 
https://diversity.ucsf.edu/resources/strategies-address-unconscious-bias [https://perma.cc/7DRP-
J35H]. 
126. Surtees, supra note 6; Biber, supra note 6. 
127. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 225 (2004). 
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70. 
129. Id. § 4321 (stating that NEPA established a “national policy” to generally “encourage 
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment” but does not dictate how a 
case will result if a violation occurs). 
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–92k. 
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regulation.131 Each environmental law statute has its own individual 
enforcement provisions, civil penalties, and criminal penalties.132 This 
field is detailed, complex, and plaintiffs must understand both the science 
and the laws in order to sufficiently assert a claim. 
To bring a civil suit under federal environmental acts, there are certain 
allegations plaintiffs should assert to constitute sufficient pleadings. Two 
things in particular are expected even though they are difficult to obtain. 
These are “the dates during which the conduct, action or inaction occurred 
or should have occurred” and the “facts necessary to relate the defendant 
with the conduct or inaction complained of.”133 Adding to this difficulty, 
some environmental statutes require even greater detail. For example, 
with respect to the Clean Air Act’s citizen suit provision, plaintiffs are 
expected to “cite the specific [National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 
or] NAAQS[,] pollutant at issue” and ensure the court can “determine 
proper compliance with the requisite notice.”134 Many plaintiffs do not 
have adequate access to these details when initially asserting their 
claim.135 
Despite the increasing threat that environmental harms like climate 
change pose, some environmental practitioners have found pleading these 
claims “onerous” under Iqbal,136 due to the difficulties in obtaining the 
necessary facts to establish causation and Iqbal’s requirement for 
specificity.137 Some scholars believe that trends in legal doctrines and case 
law “influence [a] potential plaintiff’s incentives and decisions” on what 
they should plead, or if they should sue at all.138 Few toxic torts claims are 
successfully asserted due to the difficulty in satisfying the burden of proof 
at the pleading stage.139 Federal regulatory causes of action have become 
much more popular. This illustrates the need for plaintiffs to adjust “to the 
difficulties involved in proving”140 toxic tort claims where the plaintiff 
 
131. Id. §§ 6903, 6921. 
132. Paul Tanaka, Michael Saretsky, Donna Ni, Maddy Foote & Matthew Swanson, Environmental 
Law and Practice in the United States: Overview, in PRACTICAL LAW § 2 (Thomas Reuters ed. May 
1, 2021). 
133. Ronald B. Robie, Diane R. Smith & Summer L. Nastich, CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION § 6:23 (2021). 
134. Id. (citing Chun v. Simpson, CIVIL 15-00102 LEK-RLP, 2015 WL 8492025 (D. Haw. Dec. 
9, 2015)). 
135. FUNK ET AL., supra note 79, at 10. 
136. Foster, supra note 7, at 903. 
137. Id.; see also Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2261–62. 
138. Juscelino F. Colares & Kosta Ristovski, Pleading Patterns and the Role of Litigation as a 
Driver of Federal Climate Change Legislation, 54 JURIMETRICS 329, 358 (2014). 
139. Id. at 363. 
140. Id. at 343. 
Ajayi (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:12 PM 
1130 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1113 
 
“has been injured after exposure to hazardous substances or chemicals.”141 
Toxic tort or contamination claims “may not become apparent until many 
years after the polluting event(s) took place,” making it difficult for 
plaintiffs to pinpoint exact dates or specific facts.142 
Additionally, the “diffuse nature” of climate change in general and its 
“widespread effects” make it hard for plaintiffs to show that emissions 
from a specific facility should be lowered or that the operator of the 
specific facility should be held liable for harms resulting from the 
emissions without the benefit of discovery.143 Pollutants are often fungible 
with many point sources, further showing the diffuse nature of 
environmental harms.144 This uncertainty creates a barrier to determining 
which specific source caused which specific harm.145 When a defendant 
does not follow environmental statutory requirements, a plaintiff’s ability 
to prove the defendant’s non-compliance is less complicated than proving 
causation in toxic tort claims.146 Thus, regulatory causes of action occur 
more often not only because they are simpler to assert, but because they 
tend to require lower litigation costs.147 By contrast, tort claims occur less 
frequently because they have high expenses for depositions, discovery, 
and other related costs.148 Plaintiffs choose to select causes of action that 
“can be supported with detailed facts” partially due to Twiqbal, and this 
may have resulted in fewer environmental causes of action brought and 
fewer rights vindicated.149 
Due to these limitations, plaintiffs have fewer options for selecting a 
cause of action in environmental litigation. Such particularized facts, 
 
141. Examples of Toxic Torts, DICKMAN L. OFF. P.S.C., 
https://www.dickmanlawoffice.com/personal-injury/examples-toxic-torts/ [https://perma.cc/3YG3-
ZKD5]. 
142. Pleading Standards in Environmental Cases Following the Supreme Court’s Decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal, A.B.A. (Nov. 1, 2012), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2012_13/ 
november_december/pleading_standards_environmental_cases_following_supreme_courts_decisio
ns_twombly_and_iqbal/ [https://perma.cc/2238-3TV6] [hereinafter Pleading Standards in 
Environmental Cases]. 
143. Colares & Ristovski, supra note 138, at 343. 
144. Id. at 349. 
145. Id. 
146. Id.; see also Why Toxic Torts Are Hard to Litigate and Win, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2018, 12:15 
AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/toxic_torts_litigate_win 
[https://perma.cc/8LH9-WWT2] (describing how proving causation in toxic torts is complicated 
because showing that the defendant knew a harm would occur requires discovery that can drag out 
for years as well as the need for jurors that are “willing and able to consider complex scientific 
evidence”). 
147. Colares & Ristovski, supra note 138, at 342–43. 
148. Id. at 343. 
149. Id. at 363. 
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which are unobtainable without discovery, make pleading a more 
complicated step in filing an environmental claim. In Chubb Custom 
Insurance Co. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc.,150 the plaintiff brought suit 
under CERCLA § 107(a) to recover insurance costs made to the 
company’s insured from the prior property owners that were incurred on 
the owner’s behalf in response to releases or threatened releases of 
hazardous substances on or near the property.151 CERCLA § 107(a)(4) 
requires that the insurance company have actually incurred “response 
costs” in relation to the removal or remediation of the site.152 Defendant 
Ford Motors argued that Chubb did not plead facts indicating that the 
current owner of the property incurred response costs “or that Ford is 
liable under CERCLA.”153 Although the plaintiff explained the amount of 
money incurred remediating the contamination, the parties who caused 
the contamination, and “generally when and how” the hazardous 
substances were released, the court agreed with the defendant and 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.154 The claim was dismissed because the 
plaintiff could not pinpoint exact details.155 This case highlights the 
impact of Twiqbal’s heightened requirements on environmental litigation. 
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
AND THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARD 
Asserting environmental claims after the massive shift to the Twiqbal 
pleading standard has proven onerous due to the nature of environmental 
harms and information asymmetry between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. Because it is no longer sufficient for a plaintiff to simply meet 
the “no set of facts” standard set out in Conley, the shift to Twombly and 
Iqbal resulted in “potentially dire consequences” for environmental 
plaintiffs, among others.156 The impact of Twombly and Iqbal may be most 
evident in toxic tort and “long-tail” environmental contamination claims 
 
150. No. C 09-4485 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 689940 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010). 
151. Id. at *1. 
152. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). 
153. Chubb, 2010 WL 689940, at *8. 
154. Id. at *10; see also Pleading Standards in Environmental Cases, supra note 142 (discussing 
Chubb to illustrate how pleading has changed in environmental cases after Twiqbal). 
155. Chubb, 2010 WL 689940, at *3–4. 
156. Haroff, supra note 4, at 3; see also Access to Justice Denied, supra note 75 (quoting 
Representative Johnson of the 111th Congress explaining that as a result of Twiqbal, “we are now 
beginning to see fewer instances of wrongful conduct being addressed” and that even “one case being 
thrown out due to insufficiency of pleadings . . . is justice denied”); Foster, supra note 7, at 903 
(stating that “pleading climate change actions may be very onerous under Iqbal”). 
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due to the slow-revealing nature of environmental harms.157 When years 
pass before damages are apparent, or when the defendant possesses most 
of the necessary information, the plaintiff’s ability to obtain specific 
details sufficient to meet the Twiqbal standard is inhibited. A plaintiff’s 
initial complaint must include sufficient factual allegations showing their 
claim is plausible.158 In contrast, discovery allows the parties to obtain and 
share evidence, and this provides the plaintiff an opportunity to obtain the 
necessary facts to prove their claim.159 The Twiqbal standard often stops 
a case before the plaintiff can use the tools of discovery because asserting 
a simple Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is 
the most efficient way for a defendant to respond to an environmental 
claim.160 A defendant may assert a motion to dismiss, which will be 
granted by the court if there is a “failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.”161 Alternatively, a defendant may assert an affirmative 
defense to negate their liability.162 
Further, information asymmetry as a result of environmental harms’ 
slow-revealing nature is very common in environmental litigation.163 
Information asymmetry is when one party has information to which the 
other party does not have access.164 This makes it hard for plaintiffs to 
meet their burden of proof.165 In a civil suit, this could mean the defendant 
in an environmental suit has access to pertinent information regarding a 
contamination that the plaintiff does not have access to prior to discovery. 
This asymmetry may end the plaintiff’s case before it gets to discovery or 
 
157. Gregory M. Gotwald & Brianna J. Schroeder, Pleading Standards in Environmental Cases 
Following the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, 44 NO. 2 A.B.A. TRENDS 16, 17 
(2012). “Long-tail” harm is harm that is “attributable to continuous or repeated exposure over time” 
or harm that has “a long latency period,” meaning the harm is not immediately apparent. Jennifer 
Morinigo, Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Allocation in Long-Tail Harm Claims Covered by 
Occurrence-Based Policies, THE ALI ADVISOR (Apr. 25, 2018), https://thealiadviser.org/liability-
insurance/allocation-in-long-tail-harm-claims-covered-by-occurrence-based-policies/ 
[https://perma.cc/GZT5-88XZ]. 
158. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
159. How Courts Work, supra note 15. 
160. Haroff, supra note 4, at 3. 
161. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
162. Legal Information Institute, Affirmative Defense, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/affirmative_defense [https://perma.cc/H6WU-5ZXA]. 
163. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 79, at 10. 
164. See id. See generally J. Barkley Rosser Jr., A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: The 
Economic Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, 15 REV. POL. ECON. 
3 (2003) (discussing information asymmetry in the context of economics where one party has 
information the other does not, and how changes in this information can affect outcomes). 
165. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 79, at 10. 
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trial.166 Twiqbal has made this issue worse. Some scholars believe the 
Twiqbal pleading standard “exacerbate[s] the negative consequences that 
flow from information asymmetries” that characterize environmental 
cases.167 
Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, the FRCP curtailed this asymmetric 
information through the simplified notice pleading standard and the 
process of discovery. The plausibility pleading standard set forth by 
Twiqbal undermines this and places additional burdens on plaintiffs 
seeking to bring environmental claims because tracing the harm to a single 
actor to establish causation may not be possible without discovery.168 If a 
toxic tort or contamination claim is a plaintiff’s only cause of action, 
justified plaintiffs may not be able to have their rights vindicated in the 
court system at all. In addition to placing additional burdens on plaintiffs, 
courts have been fairly inconsistent in applying the Twiqbal standard to 
affirmative defenses.169 While plaintiffs are expected to plead specific 
details that may not be available without great cost before discovery, 
defendants can generally assert affirmative defenses without providing the 
same factual detail.170 Common affirmative defenses within 
environmental litigation include res judicata, collateral estoppel, 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, laches, sovereign immunity, lack 
of ripeness, mootness, non-reviewable discretionary action, and statutory 
conflict or exemption.171 This Part further examines the ways in which 
courts have applied the heightened pleading standard. 
A. Courts that Applied the Heightened Pleading Standard to 
Environmental Plaintiffs’ Pleadings 
In cases where the heightened pleading standard has been applied to 
environmental plaintiffs, these parties have often faced successful 
FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss or roadblocks in asserting their claim 
in the first place. 




168. See Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2258. 
169. Although this Comment focuses on environmental litigation, courts have been inconsistent in 
applying affirmative defenses in non-environmental cases as well. See Herman et al., supra note 68, 
at 35. 
170. See infra section IV.B. 
171. Annotation, Affirmative Defenses in Actions Challenging Omission or Adequacy of 
Environmental Impact Statement Under § 102(2)(c) of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(c)), 63 A.L.R. Fed. 18 § 2 (2021). 
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Franzoni,172 Riverkeepers, a nonprofit organization, filed an amended 
complaint against Franzoni seeking to enforce § 7002(a)(1)(B) of 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and § 301 of the Clean 
Water Act (CWA)173 in the District Court of Maryland.174 Franzoni then 
filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted in part.175 Franzoni 
argued that the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant’s abandoned clay 
target fragments were causing “imminent and substantial endangerment 
to health and the environment” and were the source of Polycyclic 
Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) were insufficient because it was not in 
the notice sent to the defendant.176 The court agreed and granted the 
motion to dismiss in part, stating that, although the notice did contain 
references to clay debris, it did not “describe abandoned clay target 
fragments as an independent source of pollution, and makes no reference 
to PAHs whatsoever.”177 Although Riverkeepers included specific details 
about the harm endured, the court held it was not sufficient because the 
plaintiff did not directly link the clay fragments to the PAHs.178 If they 
had been able to conduct discovery, Riverkeepers may have been able to 
obtain access to information that would have linked the clay fragments to 
the PAHs. 
Additionally, in OBG Technical Services, Inc. v. Northrop Grumman 
Space & Mission Systems Corp.,179 environmental consulting firm OBG 
brought suit in the District Court of Connecticut alleging that property 
owner Northrop Grumman failed to disclose the extent of the soil and 
groundwater contamination before OBG purchased the land, and that the 
new owner failed to prevent pollutants from migrating to OBG’s parcels 
of land.180 OBG also asserted contract-based claims alleging that Northrop 
failed to indemnify OBG for migratory contaminants-related costs under 
its obligations in the Purchase Agreement.181 In 2000, OBG contacted 
Northrop Grumman to renegotiate the Purchase Agreement, and OBG 
alleged that Northrop Grumman previously stated they were open to 
renegotiating the agreement on multiple occasions.182 However, in 2005, 
 
172. 429 F. Supp. 3d 67 (D. Md. 2019). 
173. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387. 
174. Midshore Riverkeeper Conservancy, 429 F. Supp. at 71. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 72. 
177. Id. at 75. 
178. Id. 
179. 503 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D. Conn. 2007). 
180. Id. at 497. 
181. Id. at 502. 
182. Id. 
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Northrop stated that it would neither indemnify OBG nor renegotiate the 
agreement.183 The court stated the facts in the complaint were not alleged 
with sufficient particularity and that OBG simply recited the legal 
conclusion in a conclusory manner.184 The court stated that OBG’s claim 
that the defendant’s “intentional failure to disclose the true nature and 
condition of [the property] was a self-concealing violation because 
without the concealment . . . the violation against OBG could not have 
taken place” was an insufficient factual allegation.185 The court 
subsequently denied OBG’s attempt to toll the statute of limitations.186 
Ultimately, the court granted Northrop’s motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.187 The court made this decision even though OBG did not 
immediately realize the extent of the contamination due to the nature of 
environmental harm.188 
These cases illustrate the detrimental impact of the Twiqbal standard 
on environmental plaintiffs. The application of this standard often results 
in the plaintiff’s pleadings being deemed insufficient and the case being 
dismissed. Plaintiffs are forced to meet the heightened pleading standard 
while defendants often do not bear such a burden. 
B. Courts that Did Not Apply the Heightened Pleading Standard to 
Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses in Environmental Litigation 
Courts are fairly consistent in their refusal to apply the heightened 
pleading standard to defendants in environmental litigation. As a result, 
defendants may successfully assert conclusory affirmative defenses 
without satisfactory factual support, even though affirmative defenses are 
pleadings subject to the same requirements as complaints.189 
For example, in Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,190 the Davises brought a federal 
action against their vendor under the citizen suit provision of RCRA, 
which was reviewed by the Sixth Circuit.191 The plaintiffs’ complaint 
alleged that by leaving gasoline buried in the property, Sun Oil 
contributed to and caused the disposal of solid or hazardous waste which 
 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 508. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 510. 
187. Id. at 497.  
188. Id. at 510. 
189. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 478 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) 
(stating that affirmative defenses are pleadings subject to the same standard). 
190. 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998). 
191. Id. at 608. 
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may present an “imminent and substantial endangerment to health or 
environment” on the property.192 Two years prior in state court, the 
plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages for breach of contract and 
specific performance to clean up the site.193 The district court held that 
Sun Oil’s “general invocation of ‘res judicata’ in its amended answer” was 
a sufficient assertion of this defense and granted summary judgment in 
their favor.194 Res judicata may be asserted as an affirmative defense to 
bar “the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, 
or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of 
transactions” that could have, but were not, raised in the initial suit.195 A 
motion for summary judgment will be granted if “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”196 This means the court enters a judgment for the movant 
and there is no trial.197 Sixth Circuit Judge Boggs, in his partial 
concurrence and partial dissent, argued that Sun Oil’s general invocation 
did not suffice to overcome their “acquiescence in the maintenance by 
Davis of concurrent actions in state court and federal court.”198 Judge 
Boggs asserted that Sun Oil’s generally stated defense that “[p]laintiff’s 
claims [were] barred by the doctrine of res judicata” was not a sufficient 
one to object to the Davises’ claim-splitting under sections 24 and 26 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.199 
Additionally, in Ohio ex rel. Dewine v. Globe Motors, Inc.,200 plaintiffs 
brought claims in the Southern District of Ohio seeking cost recovery 
under § 107(a) of CERCLA from Globe Motors, Inc. and Northrop 
Grumman Systems Corporation.201 The plaintiff, State of Ohio, moved to 
strike a number of the defendants’ affirmative defenses and sought to 
extend the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses.202 The plaintiffs contended the defendants had not “specified 




194. Id. at 613 (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
195. Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
196. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Material Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(stating that a material fact is a “fact that is significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand; esp., 
a fact that makes a difference in the result to be reached in a given case.”). 
197. Motion for Summary Judgment, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/motion_for_summary_judgment [https://perma.cc/QPB7-TFE9].  
198. Davis, 148 F.3d at 613 (Boggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
199. Id. 
200. No. 3:18-cv-142, 2019 WL 3318354 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2019). 
201. Id. at *1. 
202. Id. 
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failed to meet the Twiqbal plausibility standard.203 The court declined to 
apply the Twiqbal standard to affirmative defenses, stating that the 
defendants do not need to “lay out the detailed basis” for such defenses.204 
The district court followed the Sixth Circuit’s standard that a pleading 
should only be stricken when “the pleading to be stricken has no possible 
relation to the controversy.”205 “No possible relation”206 is a far less 
stringent standard to meet than the “plausibility” standard laid out for 
pleadings in Twiqbal.207 In this case, the court stated that because “it 
cannot be said that these defenses have ‘no possible relation to the 
controversy,’” it would not be appropriate to strike them.208 
Further, in Suncoast Waterkeeper v. City of Gulfport,209 plaintiffs 
brought a cause of action in the Middle District of Florida under the citizen 
suit provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, alleging that 
the defendant violated § 301(a) of CWA by: “(1) discharging pollutants 
into the waters of the United States without National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (‘NPDES’) Permit authorization and (2) violating the 
terms of its NPDES Permit . . . through these discharges.”210 The 
defendant asserted a series of affirmative defenses, which the plaintiff 
argued should be stricken due to their conclusory nature and lack of 
sufficient specific factual support.211 The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument because “no prejudice” to the defendant had been shown by the 
“allegedly insufficient pleading.”212 Further, the court stated that the 
defendant could seek the factual details to support the defenses through 
discovery.213 Here, the defendants were held to a less stringent standard 
and had the privilege of asserting general claims without detailed factual 
support as opposed to the heightened pleading standard applied to 
plaintiffs. The court even recognized that the defendants would have 
access to the benefit of discovery to flesh out their defenses. 
Similarly, in Borough of Edgewater v. Waterside Construction, 
 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at *3 (quoting King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 657 (6th Cir. 2012)).  
205. Globe Motors, 2019 WL 3318354, at *1 (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)). 
206. Id. 
207. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
666 (2009). 
208. Globe Motors, 2019 WL 3318354, at *2. 
209. No. 8:17-cv-35-T-24 MAP, 2017 WL 3328398 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017). 
210. Id. at *1. 
211. Id. at *2. 
212. Id. at *4. 
213. Id. 
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L.L.C.,214 Edgewater brought suit against corporate defendants, who were 
associated with Waterside Construction, L.L.C., in the District Court of 
New Jersey.215 Edgewater sought remediation costs under CERCLA, the 
New Jersey Spill Act,216 and New Jersey common law to clean up 
Veteran’s Field after plaintiffs began the Veteran’s Field Project.217 
Plaintiff contended that the defendants’ affirmative defense of fraud was 
insufficiently pled.218 The affirmative defense stated that the “[c]ross-
claims [were] barred or subject to reduction by Alcoa’s 
misrepresentations and/or fraud in the inducement of contract.”219 The 
defendants contended that because they asserted fraud as an affirmative 
defense, they did not need to meet the Twiqbal standard.220 Although the 
court did not reach the Twiqbal issue because Alcoa did “not move[] to 
strike Defendants’ affirmative defense pursuant to Rule 12(f),” and thus 
allowed the affirmative defense to remain while denying the plaintiff’s 
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, the court nevertheless stated 
that courts in the district “have generally found the Iqbal/Twombly 
plausibility standard inapplicable to the pleading of affirmative 
defenses.”221 
Finally, in Dixon Lumber Co. v. Austinville Limestone Co.,222 Dixon 
sought to hold Austinville Limestone Company (ALC) responsible for 
environmental liabilities due to limestone tailings from a mining operation 
under CERCLA in the Western District of Virginia.223 Dixon argued that 
all of ALC’s affirmative defenses were conclusory and moved to strike 
them.224 One of the defendant’s affirmative defenses simply stated that 
“[t]he 2013 releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances at 
the Site were caused solely by an act of God.”225 The court affirmed that 
the plausibility standard in a plaintiff’s pleadings required more than a 
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”226 However, the 
court did not apply this standard to ALC, stating that its affirmative 
 
214. No. 14-5060, 2016 WL 7256873 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2016). 
215. Id. at *2. 
216. N.J. REV. STAT §§ 58:10-23.11 to -50 (2021). 
217. Borough of Edgewater, 2016 WL 7256873, at *1–2. 




222. No. 7:16-cv-00130, 2017 WL 4933053 (W.D. Va. Oct. 31, 2017). 
223. Id. at *1. 
224. Id. at *5. 
225. Id. at *6. 
226. Id. at *2 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 
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defenses were “validly pleaded.”227 The court applied an extremely broad 
and lenient standard to the defendant’s assertions, stating that “affirmative 
defenses may not be pled ‘so cryptically that their possible application 
will remain a mystery until unearthed in discovery.’”228 
As shown by these cases, defendants are frequently successful in 
asserting conclusory claims. Meanwhile, plaintiffs are left to deal with the 
burden of affirmative defenses at trial if their own pleadings are deemed 
sufficient. However, some courts have elected to apply the Twiqbal 
standard to these defenses. 
C. Courts that Applied the Heightened Pleading Standard to 
Defendants’ Affirmative Defenses in Environmental Litigation 
In a few instances, courts have applied the heightened pleading 
standard to defendants’ affirmative defenses in environmental litigation, 
which resulted in a fairer trial. 
For example, in Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,229 the 
Eastern District of New York stated that the Second Circuit made it clear 
that the Twiqbal plausibility standard applied to all pleadings, including 
affirmative defenses.230 The court struck inadequate defenses that did not 
meet the threshold, and allowed other defenses that met the standard.231 
Applying the standard to both parties in litigation holds both the defendant 
and the plaintiff to the same standard in their pleadings. While the court 
in Brooklyn admitted that plaintiffs have the statute of limitations period 
to gather facts and defendants have the twenty-one-day interval, the 
defendants must still meet the plausibility standard and not prejudice the 
plaintiff.232 The court struck defenses that were either duplicative of other 
defenses, were not alleged with sufficient specificity, or on primary 
jurisdiction grounds.233 
Further, in United States v. Brink,234 the United States brought suit in 
the Southern District of Texas to enforce the CWA against landowners 
Brink and Kalter, near the La Para Creek and the Nueces River.235 The 
plaintiff claimed that the landowners placed pollutants or fill material in 
 
227. Dixon Lumber Co., 2017 WL 4933053, at *5. 
228. Id. (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001)).  
229. 478 F. Supp. 3d 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). 
230. Id. at 425. 
231. Id. at 434–35. 
232. Id. at 425–26.  
233. Id. at 428–29, 431. 
234. No. C–10–243, 2011 WL 835828 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2011). 
235. Id. at *1. 
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the creek when they constructed a dam near the river.236 The defendants 
raised various affirmative defenses, including waiver and estoppel.237 The 
plaintiffs moved to dismiss these defenses because the defendants had not 
alleged that they obtained a permit before constructing the dam by 
contacting or consulting with the Corps of Engineers.238 The court stated 
that affirmative defenses must also satisfy the pleading standard set out in 
Twiqbal.239 The court proceeded to dismiss the defendants’ affirmative 
defense of estoppel and waiver because the defendants had not “alleged 
any affirmative misconduct on the part of the Government” and had not 
“asserted in their answer that they contacted or communicated with the 
Corps of Engineers prior to constructing a dam in La Para Creek.”240 Here, 
the court did not allow the defendants to raise affirmative defenses lacking 
factual support. 
Brooklyn and Brink highlight how applying the Twiqbal requirements 
to all pleadings, including affirmative defenses, results in a fairer trial 
where both parties are on more equal footing because they are held to the 
same standard. 
V. COURTS SHOULD SHIFT THEIR APPLICATION OF 
TWIQBAL 
Because overturning Twiqbal is unpromising, courts should apply a 
uniform pleading standard to both plaintiffs and defendants alike. 
Additionally, courts should allow deference for environmental plaintiffs’ 
pleadings. Judicial discretion remains a core function of the court system 
and would allow courts to give environmental plaintiffs much needed 
flexibility.241 Twiqbal’s implementation of the plausibility standard in all 
civil suits turned judicial discretion into a gatekeeping mechanism that 
prevents access to the courts and denies plaintiffs’ right to a fair trial, 
especially for low-income litigants.242 Twiqbal impacts all litigation, but 
especially environmental litigation because the particularized facts 




238. Id. at *4. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at *5. 
241. Thomas O. Main, Judicial Discretion to Condition, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2006). 
242. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 9, at 823–24.; see also Nichols, supra note 97, at 198–99 
(discussing the increased financial burden on plaintiffs post-Twiqbal as a result of “expensive 
prefiling investigations to meet the heightened pleading standard,” which leads to decreased access 
to justice). 
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discovery.243 The injustice that stems from the Twiqbal standard requires 
an adequate solution that both respects the current plausibility 
requirements and “ameliorates the injustice that results from dismissal of 
meritorious claims when courts enforce” this pleading burden solely on 
plaintiffs.244 
A. The Perfect Solution 
In a more just world, the Supreme Court would overrule Twiqbal, and 
the judicial system would return to simplified notice pleading. In Iqbal, 
the Supreme Court completely disregarded the roles of race and religion 
in the detentions after September 11, 2001.245 The Court was “indifferent 
to the harm of the practices it . . . legitimized.”246 The detention of Iqbal 
was deemed “rational and justified.”247 However, the identification and 
classification of potential-detainees heavily relied on factors of race, 
religion, and national origin, regardless of these individuals’ lack of 
connection to terrorism.248 Rather than adhering to congressional intent, 
the Supreme Court effectively decided what FRCP 8 meant while relying 
on a foundation of racism. This foundation has resulted in injustice 
throughout the judicial system. Simplified notice pleading was considered 
efficient for a long time. It allowed plaintiffs to sufficiently bring their 
claims to court and gain access to the tools of discovery to prove them.249 
The Supreme Court shifted to a heightened pleading standard at Javaid 
Iqbal’s expense, justifying racism and keeping future plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims out of court and away from justice. Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse the stringent standard it has set.250 
Thus, courts should apply Twiqbal to all parties and give deference to 
environmental plaintiffs due to the nature of their harms. 
B. The Twiqbal Pleading Standard Should Apply to All Parties 
The Twiqbal standard may provide for a faster and less expensive 
 
243. See Foster, supra note 7, at 903; Causation in Environmental Law, supra note 5, at 2261. 
244. Zachry Sandifer, Insurmountable Burdens and Slippery Slopes: A Solution for Pleading Toxic 
Torts in the Plausibility Era, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 435, 437 (2019). 
245. Sinnar, supra note 71, at 439. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 419. 
248. Id. 
249. Shepley, supra note 70, at 79.  
250. See Amanda Shendruk, Fewer than 2% of Supreme Court Rulings Are Ever Overturned, 
QUARTZ (May 22, 2019), https://qz.com/1326096/despite-its-pending-hard-right-turn-the-supreme-
court-is-unlikely-to-overturn-roe-vs-wade/ [https://perma.cc/NC5B-9L57].  
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resolution of each action and proceeding provided for in FRCP 1, but it 
fails to provide just resolutions, which are also called for in the same 
statute.251 The current standard favors efficiency over fairness and 
justice.252 
Defendants can assert affirmative defenses without providing the same 
factual detail that is required of plaintiffs.253 The Twiqbal standard fails to 
provide a concrete framework in defining plausibility and leaves too much 
discretion to judges. This often leads to unfairly biased opinions based 
merely on a judge’s own convictions. As shown in Iqbal, even Supreme 
Court Justices succumb to their own individual prejudices.254 The 
evidence presented in that case was appraised in a highly biased manner. 
Javaid Iqbal’s claim was dismissed because his unnecessarily harsh 
detention was justified by the Justices based on his race, religion, and 
national origin. Because Javaid Iqbal was a Muslim Pakistani man, 
Mueller’s directions to detain Arab Muslim men during the FBI’s 
September 11 investigation were deemed “rational and justified,” even 
though the identification and classification process likely heavily relied 
on those identity factors.255 This determination was often made without 
any link between the plaintiff and terrorist activities.256 The Court was 
indeed “oblivious” to Iqbal as a person and “blind” to race and religion 
with regard to post-September 11 detentions, as well as dismissive of the 
discriminatory experience of Arab Muslim men in the aftermath of 
September 11.257 The racist foundation of Iqbal and its resulting injustices 
must be remedied. Because it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will 
overturn its ruling in Iqbal, courts must apply the standard equally to all 
parties in litigation. 
It is far too easy for courts to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims before they have 
the chance to engage in discovery. Defendants can assert conclusory 
statements as affirmative defenses with ease, but these defenses deserve 
the same Twiqbal treatment the complaints receive. For example, in 
Suncoast Waterkeeper, the defendants were held to a much less stringent 
pleading standard than the plaintiffs and had the privilege of asserting 
 
251. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “should be 
construed, administered, and employed” by both courts and parties in a lawsuit “to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of every suit). 
252. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to 
Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989). 
253. See supra section IV.B.  
254. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 185, 201 (2010). 
255. Sinnar, supra note 71, at 419. 
256. Id. at 420. 
257. Id. at 439. 
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generalized claims with no factual support.258 The court asserted the 
defendant could seek the factual details needed to support their defenses 
through discovery, but did not give the same deference to the plaintiffs.259 
In Dixon Lumber Co., the court stated that defendants’ affirmative 
defenses “may not be pled ‘so cryptically that their possible application 
will remain a mystery until unearthed in discovery.’”260 
These cases illustrate that defendants are consistently given the benefit 
of discovery after asserting baseless defenses, while plaintiffs are left 
facing unreasonably high burdens. This significant discretion in the 
application of the heightened pleading standard harms plaintiffs at the aid 
of defendants. While defendants can bring a motion to dismiss “without 
ever filing a pleading,” or assert an affirmative defense with almost no 
factual support, most plaintiffs are effectively barred from bringing suit 
against their wrongdoers.261 This is especially true when discovery is 
necessary to establish the highly specific facts required, like in 
environmental cases.262 Twiqbal tipped the scale of justice in favor of 
defendants. 
However, applying the standard to defendants’ affirmative defenses 
can help plaintiffs properly establish their claims by refusing to accept 
defendants’ conclusory assertions. For example, in Brooklyn Union Gas 
Co., the court chose to hold both the plaintiff and defendants to the same 
standard of plausibility.263 This resulted in a fairer trial, where the court 
adhered to the policy of not prejudicing the plaintiff.264 This trial was 
fairer because both parties needed to allege their claims with the same 
particularity. The defendant was unable to assert merely conclusory or 
duplicative defenses that would ultimately harm the plaintiff without 
cause.265 
It is clear that applying the heightened standard across the board would 
result in more uniform and fair adjudication across jurisdictions. If 
defendants must assert their affirmative defenses with sufficient 
particularity, plaintiffs may not find it necessary to bring further motions 
 
258. Suncoast Waterkeeper v. City of Gulfport, No. 8:17–cv–35–T–24 MAP, 2017 WL 3328398, 
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017). 
259. Id. 
260. Dixon Lumber Co. v. Austinville Limestone Co., No. 7:16-cv-00130, 2017 WL 4933053, at 
*5 (W.D. Va. Oct. 31, 2017) (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 
(4th Cir. 2001)).  
261. See Subrin, supra note 76, at 580. 
262. Id. 
263. See Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 478 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425–26 (E.D.N.Y. 
2020). 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 428–29, 431. 
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against these defenses, saving both courts and plaintiffs time and money. 
C. Flexibility Should Be Given to Environmental Plaintiffs 
Regardless of whether the Twiqbal standard is uniformly applied to 
pleading requirements for both plaintiffs and defendants, environmental 
plaintiffs should be given deference in regard to the specific factual 
allegations necessary to establish a plausible cause of action.266 They 
should be given this deference because of the inherent information 
asymmetry in these types of cases and the diminishment of democracy. 
Under the current standard, plaintiffs need detailed facts from the 
beginning. This leaves the burden on them to fund premature discovery 
prior to filing their complaint. This allows defendants to further take 
advantage of the present asymmetry in information. Furthermore, it 
hinders low-income litigants from gaining access to the courts and allows 
only wealthy plaintiffs to obtain justice.267 A plaintiff’s case may easily 
end before they get to discovery or trial, showing that the Twiqbal 
standard has exacerbated the consequences of both the mismatch of 
information and the wealth of the plaintiff. This is especially so in 
environmental cases. 
A plaintiff’s ability to obtain sufficient specific details at the pleading 
stage is inhibited by the current standard because environmental cases are 
often immersed in science and the damages are not immediately apparent. 
Additionally, determining a defendant’s state of mind is nearly 
impossible. This is especially apparent in contamination cases, where the 
defendant may have willfully released a toxic chemical. Such 
particularized facts make pleading a more complicated step because it is 
difficult for plaintiffs to pinpoint exact details without discovery.268 There 
is inequitable access to the scientific information needed, which raises 
litigation costs for plaintiffs before the case has even begun. The 
unreasonably high litigation expenses in ascertaining the necessary facts 
result in expensive lawyer fees and delay a plaintiff’s case. Many litigants, 
especially low-income litigants, cannot afford the expenses of high-priced 
lawyers and the many billable hours required to satisfy the heightened 
pleading. This diminishes access to the courts, which diminishes 
 
266. While this Comment focuses on environmental plaintiffs, there is no question that there are 
other classes of plaintiffs deserving of flexibility in pleading. Particularly in discrimination cases, 
where it is hard to prove the defendants’ state of mind and only the defendants have the necessary 
facts to prove a claim. 
267. See Nichols, supra note 97, at 198–99. 
268. See, e.g., Goliad Cnty. v. Uranium Energy Corp., No. V–08–18, 2009 WL 1586688, at *10 
n.7 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2009) (finding the plaintiff lacked sufficient specific facts under Iqbal to 
plausibly show the defendant’s intention to contaminate water). 
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democracy. Under the current application, environmental rights are not 
protected. Pleadings are intended to provide notice to the parties, whereas 
discovery is intended to give the parties the opportunities to find the 
necessary facts required to establish the merit of their claims. 
As long as environmental plaintiffs provide adequate notice to 
defendants, courts should not require such specific facts. While we may 
lose efficiency through more pleadings and trials, affording 
environmental plaintiffs deference in regard to factual allegations will 
allow more plaintiffs to vindicate their rights and effectively bring suit 
against their wrongdoers. Obtaining efficiency at the expense of justice is 
not the answer. If courts are sensitive to the nature of environmental harm, 
more meritorious claims may finally see the light of day. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the plausibility pleading standard to all parties and giving 
environmental plaintiffs deference would be a start to rectifying the 
injustice that has resulted from the Twiqbal rulings. Environmental law is 
a particularly unique area of law that requires a basic understanding of the 
science behind it to understand when a harm has occurred. Since the shift 
to the plausibility pleading standard, environmental practitioners have 
found asserting claims burdensome due to the difficulty in obtaining the 
necessary and very particular facts to establish causation. Pleading has 
become a gatekeeping mechanism that prevents environmental plaintiffs 
from bringing their claims and receiving justice by dismissing potentially 
meritorious claims and allowing defendants to make general, conclusory 
assertions. The plausibility pleading requirement undermines access to 
courts and fairness. It also increases the possibility of judicial bias while 
by placing new burdens on plaintiffs that seek to bring environmental 
claims. Applying the heightened pleading standard to defendants and 
allowing environmental plaintiffs deference at the pleading stage may 
address some of the inherent inequalities that have arisen as a result of 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 
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